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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tation of the payment by the contract to the completed portion
or portions.8 2
The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Diesel
Equipment Corp. v. Epstein"3 has been affirmed by the Supreme
Court34 and will be reviewed next year.
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
The enlarged scope of the Symposium on the Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts faces the reviewer with a choice of
three approaches. First, in considering the several hundred
torts decisions of the past year the reviewer could list and give
a bare abstract of all the cases. This, I am sure, can be better
done by the commercial digesters. Second, he can select for a
little more detailed discussion those cases which he regards as
"important" and ignore the remainder; or, finally, he can carve
out of the mass of cases just a few areas that he regards as
offering an unusual challenge. This highly limited approach
makes possible a relatively full discussion within its narrow
compass. This reviewer has chosen the last of these three
alternatives. My choice was dictated almost entirely by per-
sonal preference and the feeling that I can be of more service in
this way. The reader, however, will recognize that many im-
portant decisions that otherwise would deserve discussion have
been ignored.
LIABILITY OF PROPRIETORS OF PUBLIC PLACES
Res Ipsa Loquitur
At times difficult duty problems lurk behind what appear
to be simple matters of evidential proof. While Mrs. Pilie was
proceeding down an aisle in a Baton Rouge National Food Store,
two six-bottle cartons of Coca-Cola suddenly fell from a display
32. See 5 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, DU LOUAGE, n* 374 (6th ed.
1946).
33. 159 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960).
34. 169 So. 2d 61 (La. 1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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* stack and broke, with resulting nerve injury to her foot. Apart
from testimony that she did not touch the bottles or display,
Mrs. Pilie was unable to establish anything more than the occur-
rence of the fall and resulting injury. The case,1 of course, in-
vited a discussion of res ipsa loquitur. All the judges agreed
that the only pertinent inquiry was whether negligence on the
part of the management was the most plausible inference to
be drawn from the occurrence, or whether, on the other hand, the
accident could be attributed with equal plausibility to conditions
or conduct for which the defendant was not responsible. This
simple direct attack put the cards squarely on the table.
In cases such as this the court attacks the problem by at-
tempting to envisage a series of plausible causes or explanations
of the mishap. In Mrs. Pilie's case at least the following ex-
planations of this accident would come to mind: (1) perhaps
the bottles were improperly stacked; (2) perhaps some customer
or other stranger tampered with the display and rendered it
dangerous; (3) perhaps (as one Justice suggested) vibrations
from nearby construction work rendered the pile of cartons
unsafe; (4) perhaps one of the defendant's own employees had
carelessly interfered with an originally safe arrangement of
bottles.
If the court could logically conclude that the most plausible
explanation was that the bottles were carelessly stacked or that
some employee of the defendant jostled the arrangement or
otherwise rendered it unsafe, an inference of defendant's neg-
ligence could be readily drawn. The majority of the court, how-
ever, observed that it could be surmised with equal plausibility
that other customers or outsiders had disarranged the stack
while proceeding through the aisles of the store. Hence the
majority concluded that res ipsa loquitur was not available to
plaintiff, and her case was dismissed.
The court's observation concerning the relative plausibility
of the several competing inferences is hardly open to question.
However, as the dissenting opinions pointed out, this does not
dispose of the problem unless customer conduct is to be regarded
by the court as a matter of no legal concern of the defendant
operator. For this reason, an answer to the res ipsa loquitur
problem cannot be reached without a preliminary inquiry into
1. Pilie v. National Food Stores, 245 La. 276, 158 So. 2d 162 (1963).
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the nature of the proprietor's duty. If the operator of a mer-
chandising concern engages in a type of business that encour-
ages customers to handle and thus possibly to disorder goods
on display so as to involve a danger to other customers, can he
remain passively indifferent toward the foreseeable peril thus
created for other and later customers? The accepted position
is that the management owes a duty of reasonable periodic
inspection of its premises in order to minimize dangers created
by some of its patrons toward others. 2 For this reason the pos-
sibility that the stack of bottles might have been dangerously
disordered by prior customers is not an inference that points
the finger of responsibility away from the defendant. Instead,
the prospect of customer misconduct constitutes a risk for which
the proprietor may be made answerable.
But this does not conclude the matter, for although the pro-
prietor owes a duty of reasonable inspection to minimize the
kind of danger discussed above, yet he is not an insurer against
the possibility that some customer's tampering may make his
premises dangerous. His duty is limited to "reasonable care."
Even if we were to assume that the cases of bottles were in fact
disarranged by another customer, we can still only conjecture
when the disarrangement may have taken place. If a prior cus-
tomer had dangerously molested the stack a day or two prior to
the accident, it might not be difficult to conclude that a "rea-
sonable" inspection by management would have revealed the
danger and would have afforded a fair opportunity to correct it.
But it is equally plausible to conclude that the disarrangement
was made by a customer only a few hours, or only a few minutes
before the display fell. Under this assumption the danger may
not have been revealed by any process of "reasonable" inspection
with which management can be charged.
The purpose of these rambling observations is to suggest
that the problem of proof of negligence and causation can be
undertaken only after the judge has satisfied himself not only
as to the nature of the defendant's duty but likewise as to the
extent of the protection the defendant must provide. If it is
assumed that the storekeeper must take "reasonable" steps to
guard against the prospect of customer misconduct, the question
still remains what are such reasonable steps. Is it sufficient to




require him to inspect for this danger only once a week? If so,
the falling of a case of bottles previously disarranged by an-
other customer tells us little or nothing concerning negligence
by the proprietor. If, on the other hand, the court concludes
that the requirement of reasonable care toward this kind of
:danger demands that the proprietor make several inspections
each day, or even that he maintain a continuous process of in-
spection whenever conditions are congested, then the court could
plausibly assume that inspections of the strict character thus
required would probably have revealed the dangerous condition
irrespective of when it was created. It seems to this writer,
then, that the minority have assumed a rigorous duty of inspec-
tion against the risk of customer tampering, while the majority
would apparently be satisfied with only occasional inspections
(if, indeed, the majority intended to impose any duty of inspec-
tion at all with reference to prior customer misconduct).
Finally, Sanders, J., was impressed by the possibility that
the cases of bottles might have been disordered by vibrations
originating outside the store.3 But dces not the same question
remain even under this assumption? If the proprietor knew, or
should have known, of the likelihood of vibrations, was he not
under a similar duty to inspect his wares reasonably and periodi-
cally to minimize this risk also? Of course, with respect to the
risk of vibration, it must appear that the proprietor could have
anticipated this type of danger, and proof of knowledge of the
continued existence of vibrations would be essential. But once
such knowledge is established, it seems to the writer that the
problem is the same as was discussed above.
Contributory Negligence of Patron
Serious policy problems concerning the extent of the duty
imposed by law upon proprietors of public premises have a
similar habit of emerging from behind the scene whenever the
problem ostensibly involved is that of the alleged contributory
negligence of the patron or his assumption of risk. Under ac-
cepted torts theory an injured patron who was not reasonably
alert for his own protection will be barred from recovery even
against the proprietor who has negligently created or main-
tained a dangerous condition on business premises which he has
thrown open to the public.
3. Pilie v. National Food Stores, 245 La. 276, 280, 158 So. 2d 162, 170 (1963).
.1965]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Although the plight of the inattentive customer or patron is
discussed by courts in terms of the affirmative defense of con-
tributory negligence, it is clear that the outcome of cases of
this kind clearly reflects the limited nature of the duty imposed
upon the proprietor. A rigorous insistence by the courts upon
freedom from contributory negligence on the part of the patron
has the effect of reducing the proprietor's duty to an obligation
of a very limited nature. As a result he is required only to
inspect for and to correct those dangerous conditions which an
alert patron could not discover for himself. In other words, the
primary burden of protection is placed upon the patron rather
than upon the proprietor. Furthermore, the more serious the de-
fect becomes the more likely is it to be regarded as one that
would be obvious to an alert patron and hence the better is the
chance that the proprietor will escape liability by relying upon
the contributory negligence of the business guest.
At one time courts openly announced that a proprietor of
business premises could discharge the full measure of his duty
to patrons either by making the premises reasonably safe, or
by leaving them in their dangerous condition so long as the
patron was afforded a fair warning of the danger. 4 Since rea-
sonably obvious defects afford their own warning, the pro-
prietor owed no further duty with respect to them. To put the
matter bluntly, the proprietor need afford protection only when
the patron could not with vigilance protect himself.
Perhaps the attitude described above fairly met the needs of
a rural nineteenth century society when "business premises"
were typified by the home-operated corner store where the
customer expected little in the way of special preparation for
his reception. With this we may contrast the complex urban
society of today with its elaborate luxurious theaters and its
gigantic chain stores equipped with every known alluring fea-
ture to attract a trusting public drawn from every walk of life.
This society certainly demands something more of the proprietor
than the indifferent observation that the patrons must carefully
watch out for themselves.
The problem of apportioning responsibility for accidents
between proprietor and customer is not an easy one under to-
4. This was the accepted position of the Restatement of Torts as originally
written in 1931. ALI RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343(c) (1931). As indicated here-
after, the Institute has now rejected this position.
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day's elaborate conditions. Much can be said in favor of the
situation of proprietor. The business host is not to be regarded
as an insurer of the safety of his guests, and it should not be
demanded of him that he provide and maintain utterly foolproof
premises. He should not be obliged to shoulder the inordinate
cost of providing a haven for sleepwalkers and he should be
entitled to expect some measure of cooperation in terms of safety
from those who enter his establishment. But at the same time
should he not make provision for a certain amount of expectable
heedlessness on the part of those whom he has indiscriminately
invited en masse on to his premises? Are they not entitled to
expect that a goodly provision has been made for their safety
and that they are not expected to maintain an alert watchout
for dangerous conditions that the proprietor himself could rea-
sonably avoid? The problem here is to strike a balance."
Courts in common law jurisdictions have sought to reconcile
the conflicting interests in these cases by submitting the con-
tributory negligence of the patron to the jury, which can usually
be relied upon to give weight instinctively to the plaintiff's side
of the ledger. Directed verdicts for defendants are rare in these
cases.6 Where, as in Louisiana, the issue of the patron's con-
tributory negligence must be resolved by the judge alone, the
judge should bear in mind that whenever he faces this issue
he is in truth defining the extent of the defendant-proprietor's
duty for the particular situation before him. Our Supreme Court
in Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co.Y
has already manifested its willingness to concede that some
duties imposed upon defendants are designed to protect against
the risk of the expectable heedlessness of other persons. This
observation should be particularly appropriate to the duty of
proprietors of business establishments: they should anticipate
and prepare for a certain amount of expectable indifference on
the part of those who enter their premises- this is one of the
risks that calls the duty of reasonable preparation of business
premises into being. The proper object of decision in these situ-
ations is to strike a fair balance between what should be ex-
5. See the excellent discussion in 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.13 (1956).
Also, Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 629, 631-33 (1952).
6. Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L.
REv. 61 (1945).
7. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962), 23 LA. L. REv. 142 (1963) ; 23 LA. L.
REv. 281, 288 (1963).
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pected of the proprietor and what should be expected of the
patron. The patron should not be arbitrarily disqualified when-
ever it is found that an alert customer could have avoided the
dangerous condition for which the defendant is responsible.
Several Louisiana decisions from the courts of appeal tackled
the problem of the contributory negligence of patrons during
the past term. This writer was left with the impression that in
most instances policy considerations of the kind discussed above
were the motivating factors behind the decision that the patron
was or was not guilty of contributory negligence. In some in-
stances where the courts held that the plaintiff was barred by
his own contributing fault it is fairly apparent that the alleged
defect charged against the proprietor constituted a minor risk
which the proprietor could fairly expect that any except the
most foolhardly patron would avoid.8 Although in these cases
the premises were not utterly foolproof, they should not be ex-
pected to be so. Similarly, where the danger consisted of a
transitory peril, such as rain water tracked into the store which
caused a patron to slip and fall, the court denied recovery be-
cause of plaintiff's "contributory negligence." The denial of
liability could equally well have been justified by the observa-
tion that the proprietor had done all that could reasonably be
expected of him with respect to rain continually tracked into
-his establishment; the remaining risk must be referred to the
duty of customers who enter under such circumstances to an-
ticipate such conditions and to avoid them.
Conversely, where the management of a self-service grocery
store left boxes in the aisle of his establishment, the court re-
fused to brand as contributory negligence the inadvertence of a
customer who tripped over them and fell. 10 The imposition of
liability upon the defendant despite the alleged misconduct of
the patron could have been justified with equal ease by observing
that a storekeeper is not permitted by law to clutter up his store
aisles unnecessarily during business hours in the vain expecta-
tion that all his customers will maintain a careful watchout in
8. Magoni v. Wells, 154 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (patron in
restaurant fell when he failed to observe a step in the aisle of defendant's restau-
rant; no evidence of inadequate lighting; opinion properly emphasizes limited
duty) ; Lester v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 155 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963)
(similar; step leading to station platform; no similar mishap for many years).
9. Burns v. Child's Properties, Inc., 156 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).




order to avoid the results of his own carelessness. Similarly a
patron of a swimming pool recovered for injuries suffered when
she fell on a slick concrete surface near the only exit to the
pool." It was shown that the attendants had knowledge of
similar accidents at this place in the past. It also appeared that
rubber mats were available and were used at other areas near
the pool and that the danger of slipping could have been mini-
mized by roughing the concrete surface. The majority opinion
refused to disqualify the plaintiff because of her own negligence
in not watching her step despite the fact that she was aware of
the danger. There was a sharp dissenting opinion by Hood, J.
A few decisions seem to betray a more mechanical approach
and to regard any carelessness by the customer as an automatic
bar to his recovery. In Kramer v. Etie12 defendant, who had
installed a coin-operated phonograph in a restaurant, undertook
to repair the machine and, while working, left a large metal
box of tools in the aisle where a waitress tripped over it and
fell. Here the negligence of the defendant was inexcusable, and
the inattention of the plaintiff who was encumbered with a
tray of hot coffee is the type of inadvertence that defendant
might well have anticipated. Perhaps the finding of the court
that she was precluded from recovery by reason of her own
contributory negligence was influenced by the fact that defend-
ant was not the proprietor of the establishment, although it is
doubtful that this should be a matter of any importance in view
of the obvious indifference of defendant toward the safety of
others.
EFFORTS TO COERCE PAYMENT OF DEBT-
A CONTRAST OF TORT THEORIES
Unfortunately, Louisiana is the only remaining American
jurisdiction where the malicious inducement of a breach of con-
tract is not regarded as an actionable wrong.13 This writer sug-
gests that the impelling urge to afford some relief in the more
11. Richard v. General Fire & Cas. Co., 155 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963).
12. 155 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
13. Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 8 So. 2d 361 (1942). This reluctance to
recognize inducement as a tort places Louisiana outside the current of authority
in both civil law and common law jurisdictions. It probably arose as the result
of an overly literal interpretation of dicta from an earier decision denying a cause
of action for alienation of a wife's affections. Moulin v. Monteleon, 165 La. 169,
115 So. 447 (1927).
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aggravated situations of this kind may have prompted an allow-
ance of recovery by the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit
last year in Pack v. Wise. 14 The court, deprived under our juris-
prudence of any resort to the wrong of inducement of breach,
fell back upon the ill-defined torts of violation of privacy and
the infliction of extreme emotional distress. Pack, the plaintiff,
was a bank employee who had undertaken on the side to publish
a commercial shoppers' guide, and he made contact with the
defendant, a printer, looking toward its release. Shortly there-
after the enterprise was transferred to a corporation in which
plaintiff held initially forty percent and later twenty percent
of the stock. The company faced serious financial difficulties
and the defendant became very apprehensive about payment
of his accumulated printing charges. Whether or not plaintiff
was personally liable for the corporation's debt to defendant
was a matter of bona fide serious dispute between them. De-
fendant approached the bank-employer (of which he was a
valued customer) and sought its assistance in persuading plain-
tiff to pay. Plaintiff denied to the bank that he was personally
involved in any way. The employer notified defendant of the
plaintiff's explanation, but at the same time it urged plaintiff
to attempt an amicable settlement of the dispute. Thereafter,
plaintiff, through his attorney, wrote defendant ordering him
to cease communicating with his employer and he threatened
to initiate suit. Defendant handed the letter to the bank in
protest and a conference was held which resulted in plaintiff's
dismissal on the ground that he had adopted coercive measures
rather than attempting a friendly setlement of the disagreement.
This led to the present suit which was based indiscriminately
on violation of privacy and the infliction of intense emotional
disturbance.
The court allowed recovery, and it included damages for loss
of the plaintiff's job, as well as for injury to his dignity and
personality. Apparently the loss of position was regarded as an
element of parasitic damage growing out of the invasion of
plaintiff's dignitary interests, although this was not discussed
in the opinion. If this surmise is correct, the case marks a dra-
matic reversal of the tendency prevalent everywhere until fair-
ly recent years to regard violations of dignity and privacy them-
14. Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 157
So. 2d 231 (La. 1963), 24 LA. L. REv. 953 (1964).
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selves as merely parasitic damages that arise as a result of the
commission of some other and better recognized tort, such as
assault, battery, imprisonment, trespass, or (where the tort is
recognized) the inducement of breach of contract.15
In discussing the case in terms of the theories of privacy and
emotional distress, it is well to bear in mind that in cases of
this kind the two approaches are almost indistinguishable and the
boundary of neither theory is well defined. Privacy emphasizes
open disclosure and excessive publication of plaintiff's name,
his likeness or his intimate personal affairs. In its inception the
theory was restricted to publications by way of mass media such
as newspaper and advertising. 6 It is doubtful that excessive
publicity was the gist of Pack's complaint. The bank employee
was not concerned with the breadth of publication to which he
was exposed. His true complaint was over the fact that infor-
mation was divulged to a single person who was in a position
to inflict upon him an economic loss - the termination of his
contract of employment. This suggests that the true nature of
the complaint was inducing breach of contract or loss of the
economic security of his situation. Any dignitary interest in
being free from public observation appears to be purely inci-
dental to Pack's complaint.
Closely allied to privacy is the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional disturbance. Typical of situations involving this
tort are insults and grossly indecent social behavior that seri-
ously offends the sensibilities. The Restatement of Torts, after
15. "Notwithstanding its early recognition in the assault cases, the law has
been slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal
protection, even as against intentional invasions. It is not until comparatively
recent years that there has been any general admission that the infliction of
mental distress, standing alone, may serve as the basis of an action, apart from
any other tort. In this respect, the law is clearly in a process of growth, the
ultimate limits of which cannot as yet be determined." PROSSER, TORTS 41-42 (3d
ed. 1964).
It was not until 1948 that the Restatement of Torts was revised so to recog-
nize emotional distress as an independent tort. Compare ALI RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 46 (1931) and the amended version (1948 Supp.).
Accounts of the resort to other independent wrongs as a means of allowing
recovery for insult and outrage include, Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF.
L. REV. 40 (1956) ; Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language,
4 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1951). Louisiana was one of the first states to recognize
the new tort without resort to subterfuge. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84
So. 37 (1920).
16. PROSSER, TORTS 835 (3d ed. 1964) ; see particularly cases cited in note
83 refusing to recognize as a violation of privacy a disclosure of plaintiff's indebt-
edness to his employer or other individuals in private. To be contrasted with the




considerable vacillation, has defined this tort as requiring of
necessity the element of "outrageousness" that deeply harms the
sensibilities of another.17 Insults that fail to demonstrate the
characteristic of extreme and outrageous misconduct are not
generally actionable. In light of the above observation on emo-
tional disturbance, the court's continued insistence that Wise's
conduct was in no way malicious or prompted by evil motives
becomes all the more confusing. Under such circumstances his
behavior certainly was not extreme or outrageous, and hence it
did not qualify for the theory advanced by the court.
It can be readily conceded that violations of privacy and in-
flictions of emotional disturbance have been employed by courts
both in Louisiana and elsewhere as vehicles to support decisions
awarding damages for abusive collection tactics.18 In most of
these cases, however, extremely harsh and insulting methods
were resorted to, or the existence of the claimed indebtednss
was given extensive and unnecessary publicity. Furthermore, in
most cases of this kind the suit was against a professional loan
agency or installment seller and the practice that was condemned
could be regarded as a well-defined current tactic of extreme
character which the courts sought to discourage. Always the
predominant element in the collection cases has been the humil-
iation or other injury to his sensibilities suffered by the alleged
debtor.
The opinion in the Pack case emphasizes that there was no
intention to hold arbitrarily that a creditor subjects himself to
17. RESTATEMENT, TORTS SECOND, Tentative Draft No. 1, § 46 (adopted
1957): "(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from it."
The Reporter's Comments to this section are of particular interest:
"d. Extreme and outrageous conduct. The cases thus far decided have found
liability only where the defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It
has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious
or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even
that his conduct has been characterized by 'malice', or a degree of aggravation
which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability
has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. General-
ly, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of
the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, 'Outrageous!'"
18. See the many cases of this type discussed at length in both the majoritY'
and dissenting opinions throughout the Pack decision. See also Prosser's discus-
sion of these cases in PROSSER, TORTS 49-50 (3d ed. 1964). In each instance the
"outrageous" character of defendant's conduct is obvious. I
[Vol. XXV
PRIVATE LAW
tort liability whenever he seeks the cooperation of his debtor's
employer in attempting to collect. Instead, the court announced
that it must seek to determine in each instance whether the cred-
itor's conduct exceeded the bounds of "reasonableness." But
however much the flexibility of this term may commend it for
general usage, it must be emphasized that the interests of the
plaintiff injured in the insult cases is merely his claim to peace
of mind or privacy. Although an approach to a debtor's employ-
er may, upon due consideration by the court, be found to be "un-
reasonable," this alone would be far short of condemning the
conduct as "outrageous" or "extreme."
Finally, we can profitably speculate on the outcome of this
dispute if it could have been tried on a theory of inducing breach
of contract (contrary to the prevailing denial of such a tort in
Louisiana). If the approach of the Restatement of Torts is fol-
lowed, it will be found that an actionable tort is committed by a
defendant who purposefully induces a third person to terminate
a contract or other advantageous economic expectancy which
the. plaintiff has with reference to such person, unless the de-
fendant's conduct is privileged. Privilege, the key to the entire
inquiry, is determined by the balancing of several factors listed
in section 767 of the Restatement of Torts. These are:
(a) The nature of the defendant's conduct,
(b) The nature of the expectancy with which his conduct
interferes,
(c) The relations between the parties,
(d) The interests sought to be advanced by the defendant,
(e) The social interest in protecting the expectancy on the
one hand, and the defendant's freedom of action on the
other.
Without pursuing the inquiry into inducement much further,
it is noteworthy that, as to factor (a), defendant Wise did not
expressly demand that Pack's employment be terminated, al-
though he obviously hoped that an implied threat of withdraw-
ing his patronage from the bank would induce a threat of dis-
missal that would prompt the plaintiff to accede to Wise's de-
mands. As to (b), it can be noted that Pack's employment con-
tract was subject to termination by the bank. His dismissal,
19651
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then, did not constitute a breach of contract, but, rather was the.
termination of a factually advantageous expectancy (but even
this expectancy will receive protection against inducement if
other factors strongly suggest that a privilege be denied). 19 As
to (c), Wise bore no relation to the bank such as counsellor or
stockholder that would support the propriety of his conduct.
Finally, as to (d), Wise was prompted, not by ill will, but by
the desire to protect his own financial interests in connection
with an entirely collateral matter.
The purpose of the above digression is to suggest that the
true problem in Pack v. Wise revolves naturally and plausibly
around the considerations that determine when there has been
an actionable inducement of breach of contract. The court's re-
sort to the term "reasonableness" acquires a meaningful signifi-
cance when it is referred to the balancing of factors under this
tort. Since the tort of inducing breach of contract is not recog-
nized in Louisiana, the court did the best it could with what was
at hand. It may be feared, however, that its choice of the
theories of privacy or insult as applied to the facts can prove




In view of the great responsibility of personal sureties, one
would expect them to be more careful and exact in stating the
scope of their undertaking. Fortunately for them, the stricti
19. "[T]he overwhelming majority of the cases have held that interference with
employments or other contracts terminable at will is actionable, since until it is
terminated the contract is a subsisting relation, of value to the plaintiff, and pre-
sumably to continue in effect. The possibility of termination does, however, bear
upon the issue of the damages sustained, and it must be taken into account in
determining the defendant's privilege to interfere. So much more is allowed in
the way of interference to further the defendant's own legitimate interests where
the contract is subject to such termination, that contracts terminable at will might
very well be placed in an intermediate classification of their own, half way be-
tween contracts for a definite term and the mere expectancy of prospective ad-
vantage. The courts, however, do not appear to have recognized them as a separ-
ate group; and to avoid too much repetition, it seems desirable to consider them
with other contracts, with the recognition that they receive much more limited
protection." PROSSEB, ToRTS 956-57 (3d ed. 1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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